1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 6 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7 8 9 In Re Chapter 7 10 GRACE P. THOMPSON, Case No. 04-6263-SSC 11 Debtor. Adv. No. 04-1166 12 LAWRENCE J. WARFIELD. **MEMORANDUM** 13 Chapter 7 Trustee DECISION 14 Plaintiffs, 15 16 GRACE P. THOMPSON 17 18 Defendant. 19

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I. Introduction

This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiff's December 27, 2004 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant/Debtor, Grace P. Thompson, filed a response to the Motion on January 28, 2005, entitled an "Answer". The Plaintiff subsequently filed a Reply on February 4, 2005. On March 8, 2005, the Court held oral argument on the Motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found in favor of the Plaintiff, granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.

In this Memorandum Decision, the Court has now set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 7052 of the <u>Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure</u>. The issues addressed herein constitute a core proceeding over which this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334(b) and 157(b) (West 2005).

II. Factual Background

The relevant facts in this matter are undisputed. The Debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition on April 13, 2004. On May 19, 2004, the Trustee filed a Motion to Compel Turn Over of Estate Assets in Connection with certain non-exempt funds in the amount of \$4,200.00¹ ("Motion") held by Debtor at the time of filing her petition. On June 15, 2004 Debtor filed a response to the Motion, which she entitled an "Answer." In her Answer, the Debtor claimed that the \$4,200.00 was exempt under Arizona's homestead exemption statute. A hearing on the Motion was set for June 22, 2004. At the June 22 hearing, counsel for the Plaintiff, after a prior consultation with the Debtor, requested a continuance of the hearing. The Debtor did not attend this hearing. During the hearing, the Court advised the Plaintiff's counsel that the Debtor might appear telephonically for future hearings. The hearing was continued to August 2, 2004 at 10:30 am. The Court separately sent a copy of the Minute Entry to the Debtor at her change of address as reflected on the Court Docket.

On June 23, 2004, the counsel for the Trustee filed a separate Motion to Compel Turn Over of Estate Assets⁶ ("Tax Motion") in connection with the Debtor's 2002 and 2003 Federal and State income tax returns, requiring a turnover of any tax returns by September 1, 2004, and the turnover of any refunds by November 1, 2004. A hearing for the Tax Motion was set for August 2, 2004 at 10:30 am.⁷ The Debtor has yet to file a responsive pleading as to the

1. Dkt. #7.

2. Dkt. #11

3. According to the Debtor's own pleadings, the sum of \$4,300.00 in question was used to purchase a trailer on or about April 30, 2004. The \$4,300.00 did not come from a previous homestead. Accordingly, the money used to purchase the trailer was not entitled to a homestead exemption under A.R.S. § 33-1101.

- 4. See Minute Entry from June 22, 2004 hearing. Dkt. #20
- **5.** See Dkt. #20 and #8.
- 6. Dkt. #15.
- 7. Dkt. #16.

Tax Motion.

The Trustee sent notice of the hearing for the Tax Motion on June 24, 2004, and sent a Notice of Continued Hearing for the other Motion on June 25, 2004. The Trustee filed Certificates of Service for both Motions.⁸ Both Motions were, thus, scheduled for hearing on August 2, 2004.

On July 27, 2004, the Trustee filed a Motion to Continue both hearings with the Court.⁹ This Motion was prompted by the Trustee's decision to substitute a new counsel for him in all of his bankruptcy matters. Recognizing that such an action on extremely short notice was not appropriate, on July 28, 2004, the Trustee withdrew the Motion to Continue.¹⁰ On July 30, 2004, the Court independently viewed the Motion to Continue, when filed in this and so many other cases, as inappropriate and denied the Trustee's Motion to Continue.¹¹

On August 2, 2004 a hearing was held on both Motions. The Debtor failed to appear at the hearing, either telephonically or in person. It must be emphasized that given the late filing of the Motion to Continue by the Trustee, and the prior notice of the hearing by the Court and Trustee's counsel in June 2004, the Debtor could not have reasonably relied on the July 27, 2004 Motion to Continue the August 2, 2004 hearings. In any event, the Motion to Continue was not granted.

On August 2, 2004, the Court granted both Motions during the hearing.¹² As a result, the Court issued an Order requiring the Debtor to turn over her 2002 and 2003 tax returns by September 1, 2004, and required a turnover of any refunds that the Debtor received by November 1, 2004.¹³ The Court issued a separate Order requiring the Debtor to turn over the

8. Dkt. ##17, 19.

^{9.} Dkt. #21.

^{10.} Dkt. #25.

^{11.} Dkt. #27.

^{12.} See Minute Entry of August 2, 2004 Hearing. Dkt. #30.

^{13.} Dkt. #32.

non-exempt funds that she held at the time of filing her bankruptcy petition in the amount of \$4,200.00 by September 1, 2004. On August 11, 2004 Debtor was served with both orders. The Debtor did not not serve and file any motions or pleadings in response to the Orders. The Debtor has still not complied with the Orders and has offered no reasonable explanation for her conduct.

On November 11, 2004, the Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the Debtor, objecting to her discharge under 11 U.S.C. §727(c)(1), (a)(6) for refusing to obey a lawful order of the Court.

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056(c). Ruling on a motion for summary judgment necessarily implicates that substantive evidentiary standard of proof which would apply at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Procedurally, "the proponent of a summary judgment motion bears a heavy burden to show that there are no disputed facts warranting disposition of the case on the law without trial." In re Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545, 547 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). Once that burden has been met, "the opponent must affirmatively show that a material issue of fact remains in dispute." Frederick S. Wyle P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 764
F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1985).

The opponent may not assert the existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties. <u>Liberty Lobby</u>, 477 U.S. 242 at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 Instead, to demonstrate that a genuine factual issue exists, the objector must produce

^{14.} Dkt. 31.

^{15.} Dkt. #33.

affidavits which are based on personal knowledge, and the facts set forth therein must be admissible in evidence. <u>Aquaslide</u>, at 547. In addition, summary judgment must be used with care and restraint, <u>Hutchinson v. United States</u>, 677 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1982), and is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. <u>Hifai v. Shell Oil Co.</u>, 704 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983).

B. <u>Denial of Discharge for Failure to Obey Court Order</u>

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Pursuant to §727(c)(1), the trustee may object to the granting of a discharge under Subsection (a). Pursuant to §727(a)(6) a debtor is not entitled to a discharge, if the debtor has refused to obey a lawful order of the court. Here, the Debtor has clearly refused to obey Court Orders. Despite the Orders issued on August 10, 2004, the Debtor has failed to turn over the assets or the tax returns to the Trustee as required by the Court.

The Debtor's sole defense for failing to turn over estate assets is that she was denied her Constitutional right to be heard. This claim has no basis in fact or law. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action an afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Virtual Vision, Inc. v. Praegitzer Industries Inc., 124 F.3d 1140, 1144 (C.A.9 Wash. 1997) quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The Debtor was given ample notice of all hearings. The Debtor claims that the Trustee's Motion to Continue the August 2, 2004 hearing justified her not attending the hearing. This is not supported by the facts. First, the Trustee withdrew his Motion to Continue the day after filing it. Second, the Court denied the Motion three days after it was filed. The Court has already provided, in the factual portion of this Decision, the information that the Trustee was having difficulty as to how to proceed given his request to change his counsel, and such procedures were causing the Court to intercede and deny the relief the Trustee was requesting. Given the ample notice in June 2004 of the August 2, 2004 hearing to the Debtor, and the fact that the Motion to Continue was quickly withdrawn and separately ruled on by the Court, there was no reasonable basis for the Debtor to rely on such a Motion to Continue as a basis for not showing up at a hearing. Moreover, the Debtor has made no claim, nor could

she, that she thought that the hearing was continued. Finally, the Debtor filed no response after the Court issued the Orders, seeking to set them aside or to reconsider them. All of these facts conclusively show that the Debtor was not denied her right to be heard.

Assuming, *arguendo*, that the Debtor was not afforded the right to be heard at the August 2 hearing, this would not change the outcome of this matter. She was given the opportunity to present her case, on the merits, at the March 8, 2005 hearing. There, she reiterated her argument that the \$4,200.00 was exempt under the Arizona's homestead exemption statute. Consistent with her filings with the Court, the Debtor stated that the \$4,200.00 was spent post-petition and was not money received from the sale of a prior homestead. According to her own statements in open court and her court filings, the Debtor is not entitled to a homestead exemption. Additionally, the Debtor has given no reason for not turning over her 2002 and 2003 tax returns or any refunds that she may have received. In short, the Trustee has shown conclusively that he is entitled to the relief requested.¹⁶

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court will execute a separate order incorporating this Memorandum Decision.

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Honorable Sarah Sharer Curley

Chief U. S. Bankruptcy Judge

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DATED this 2nd day of May, 2005.

BNC to NOTICE

^{16.} The Court notes, that the Debtor was given ample opportunity to work out a payment agreement with the Trustee. Both the Court and the Trustee made it clear that the Debtor could consider such an alternative. Despite these statements, the Debtor determined that she did not want to pursue any settlement of the matter.